May 17, 2018
In Stearns v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the Massachusetts District Court, Zobel, J., addressed whether the Massachusetts statute of repose for certain tort actions, codified as Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260 § 2B (“Section 2B”), applies to asbestos claims.
In Stearns, the plaintiffs brought a wrongful death claim on behalf of the decedent, Wayne Oliver. Mr. Oliver worked as a pipe inspector during the construction of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station from 1971 to 1978. The defendant, General Electric (“GE”), was responsible for the design, manufacture and installation of steam turbine generators at the Pilgrim Station. The plaintiffs alleged that GE was responsible for “procuring the turbine’s thermal insulation material” which contained asbestos-containing insulation materials. In 2016, Mr. Oliver died of mesothelioma, and the plaintiffs brought an action against GE.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs claimed that Mr. Oliver was exposed to asbestos-containing insulation material at the Pilgrim Station “on the turbine floor when insulation work was being performed” which ultimately caused his death. In response, GE filed a motion for summary judgment invoking the protection of Section 2B. The Court recognized that “the statute of repose sets a six-year limit before which any tort action alleging deficiency or neglect in ‘the design, planning, construction or general administration or an improvement to real property’ must be commenced.” In addressing the motion for summary judgment, the Court noted that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had not yet addressed whether Section 2B applies to asbestos claims.
The Court denied the motion for summary judgment. In denying the motion, the Court relied upon Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701 (Mass. 1982) which notesthat “the Legislature had struck a reasonable balance between the public’s right to a remedy and the need to limit liability” in enacting Section 2B.In addition, the Court recognized that the “underlying acts”which form the basis of the litigation determine whether a defendant is entitled to protection under Section 2B. Accordingly, the Court held that “it is not at all clear that the six-year statute of repose was designed to bar a category of claims known uniformly to have a latency period of at least twenty years. To so hold would transform a statute intended to limit liability into one that create absolute immunity.”
Although Stearns appears to favor plaintiffs, it is not the death knell for defense counsel moving for summary judgment under Section 2B. As the Court acknowledged, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has not addressed the limits of Section 2B with respect to asbestos claims. As such, there is still no definitive appellate authority on this issue from the highest court in the state, leaving open the opportunity to convince lower courts that Section 2B does apply to asbestos claims and that Stearns should not carry the day.